Introduction
The importance of a knowledge economy (KE) has emerged as a key theme in the late 1990s as OECD and World Bank reports illustrate (OECD, 2002; World Bank, 2007; Peters, 2008; Weber, 2011) . It is now well established that technological knowledge and innovation are long-run drivers of economic growth (Lerner, 2009) . Already following the example set by Japan, the governments of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and China are moving rapidly towards 'knowledge-based' economies from 'product-based' economies (Chandra and Yokoyama, 2011) . This is happening because knowledge creation and diffusion processes depend on appropriate governance policies that are themselves outcomes of good governance -a self-reinforcing and endogenous process. To determine the relevance of the Asian experience to other developing and emerging economies, and the current excitement with the knowledge economy (KE), it is important to identify the institutional factors that promote the creation and diffusion of knowledge, and to ensure that economies not at the technological frontier have access to new technologies developed by technology leaders.
Middle Eastern and North African (MENA), and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) states have remained feeble, and according to their governance indicators as measures of institutional performance have similarly fared poorly in the last ten years or so. The effect of this poor institutional performance on the development, and the main components of the knowledge society, of these nations, while not a secret (UNDP, 2009), has not been quantified as far as we are aware. With respect to the MENA region, we know from a World Bank report that these nations were not investing in key areas that are fundamental to KEs, and specifically that "to
date, related investments in education, information infrastructure, research and development (R&D), and innovation have been insufficient or inappropriate in most MENA countries.
Moreover, inadequate economic and institutional frameworks prevent these investments from yielding desired results" (Aubert & Reiffers, 2003, p.1) . Similarly, Aubert (2007) shows that SSA countries in general have not done well in this regard either, mainly because of the weak linkages between institutions and appropriate technologies that are capable of fostering both foreign and domestic investment. These arguments are not hard to understand; the institutional framework is crucial for gaining an adequate flow of knowledge between scientific research and technological applications, as well as for a good information flow between knowledge users and researchers. Governments play a key role; the creation of knowledge cannot be left to imperfect market mechanisms. Good governance is critical to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and to motivating domestic investment, both of which contribute to the development of the infrastructure of a KE 1 .
Along the strong interest in the KE themselves has come growing emphases on
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), and hence the acknowledgement that the enforcements of IPR laws (treaties) by governments have a critical bearing on how developing economies are tilting towards KEs. Based on the situation, the prime objective of this paper is to assess the instrumentality of IPR laws (treaties) in various KE dimensions through good governance channels 2 . In other words, the paper examines how government enforcement of IPR laws is affecting the progress of 22 SSA and MENA countries towards KEs. The examination is important because while much emphasis in the literature have gone to developed and emerging economies of Latin America and East Asia, there has been little scholarly attention paid to the SSA-MENA region. This paper is a modest attempt to fill some of that information gap.
1 Though there is no doubt that good governance helps to promote the KE, we admit that the second statement may be debatable because FDI on its own may not be a sufficient promoter of KE. 2 It should be noted that, there is also a wealth of literature that criticizes the use of IPRs through international treaties as forbearers of KE (Drahos, 2002; May & Sell, 2001; May, 2006 May, , 2007 .
We rationalize this focus with the fact that one of the key pillars of the KE is a favorable institutional framework. The importance of this pillar has been covered in the literature on good governance and the knowledge-based economic development in Latin America (Dahlan, 2007) and in East Asia (Chandra and Yokoyama, 2011) . From the coverage a positive relationship between good governance and the creation of KE is discernible. Except in China 3 , formal institutions have played an important role in attracting FDI, and thereby helped in developing the knowledge-based economic infrastructures necessary for the KEs. Unfortunately, this same literature is not as clear for the SSA and MENA region. The few papers that have focused on the KE of this region have been limited to the impact of knowledge on economic growth using crosssectional data (Chavula, 2010) . While such a nexus is important, the current debate has centered around how and whether SSA and MENA countries can replicate the 'East Asian miracle'. Thus, integrating IPRs and governance structures into the equation is badly needed to provide an updated account of the debate regarding the SSA-MENA countries.
This paper contributes to existing literature in six different ways. Firstly, unlike previous research, it incorporates all dimensions of government quality in its analysis, and hence it provides an exhaustive assessment of six institutional quality indicators. Secondly, the paper puts an investigating lens on the SSA-MENA region. A great chunk of research on the KE focuses on developed and emerging economies of Latin America and East Asia, unfortunately leaving behind only scanty evidence of the nexus in SSA and MENA countries. Thirdly, in contrast to the mainstream approach which is premised mostly on one or two dimensions of the KE, this paper employs all of the four components in the World Bank's Knowledge Economy Index (KEI): economic incentive, innovation, education, and information infrastructure. Fourthly, the significant trends in the KE development witnessed worldwide over the last decade have brought to clear light the growing relevance of IPR treaties, and therefore assessing how the enforcement of these laws affects various dimensions of KE via good governance in developing countries could provide the needed guidance to policy makers. Fifthly, while some aspects of KE might have been investigated before good governance indicators for developing countries were available, this paper uses recent data to update the account of the nexus, and it does so with focused policy implications. Sixthly, one motivation of this work is the ongoing debate on the 'East Asian miracle', which has been either based on concepts like 'soft authoritarian character'
and/or 'governing the market'. Such a debate is premised on certain political and economic conditions that were somehow judged propitious for development. However, some other evidence suggests to the contrary that the 'East Asian miracle' could have been caused instead by low enforcement of IPR regimes at the early stages of these nations' development, e.g., gains from trade distortions like undervalued rates of currency exchange and even innovation copying (imitations), in addition to the accumulation of human and physical capital (Bezmen & Depken, 2004) . Still other evidence Lucas argues that there was not anything miraculous about the East Asian miracle (1988; 1993) . Hence, examining this debate in the context of SSA and MENA countries could result in relevant policy and further research recommendations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theory and its empirical evidence. Data and methodology issues are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.
Theory and empirical evidence

Institutions and knowledge-based economies
The fundamental challenge in fostering any KE is to harness knowledge for development by providing an enabling environment for a competitive educational system, highly qualified human resources, excellent information, communication technology infrastructure (ICT), and a capable scientific infrastructure for innovations (Chandra & Yokoyama, 2011) . Where domestic R & D is weak or nonexistent, FDI is a good, though imperfect, substitute, and hence extant literature suggests that the main institutional impediment to FDI may not lie in its effect on the rates of return on investing abroad, but also on the excess risk that such investment entails.
Unlike trade, foreign investment is not only subject to a risk of predation and hold-up, but also to expropriation and nationalization risks. For example, Harms & Ursprung (2002) argue that authoritarian regimes are associated with a greater risk of policy reversals due to the dictator's own whims, the need to raise public support through populist measures, or simply coups d'etat. Globerman & Shapiro (2002) , Stern (2003), and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) also find that various measures of governance quality are related to FDI inflows. All this work shows that the quality of institutions and of the regulatory system operating in an economy, have a significant impact on inward FDI, and the latter affects the KE, especially in developing countries.
Finally, Lambsdorff (2003) finds that the predictability of corruption has an impact on inward capital flows that is distinct from the impact of the level of corruption. Other authors find that defective institutions tend to be correlated with lower literacy rates, larger public investment in unproductive assets (Mauro, 1998) , and lower expenditures devoted to the maintenance of past projects than effective institutions. Hence, by encouraging unproductive public investments that result in less efficient public facilities and a slow accumulation of human capital, defective institutions also indirectly hamper countries' attractiveness to foreign investment, and therefore the development of the KE.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in Knowledge Economy (KE)
According to the literature there are two main avenues along which IP and the strength of IPR regimes influence the level of KE, which we describe briefly below (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Andrés & Goel, 2012) . The first captures the degree to which IPRs influence the creation of new knowledge and information within individual nations, as well as the diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second is the indirect effect of a nation's IPR regime on international transactions that provide factors crucial for the growth process.
Creation and dissemination of information
The endogenous theories of economic growth, whereby investment in research and development (R&D) results in profit (returns) to individual investors and also increases society's stock of knowledge, represent the basis for IPRs protection. According to Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) , for instance, by diminishing the cost of future innovation, the accumulation of knowledge fosters economic growth. Grossman and Lai (2004) describe the benefits of establishing an effective system of intellectual property rights, but some researchers find that the effects of IPRs on growth depends on the level of economic development, that there is some threshold, and we say more on that argument later, fundamentally, tighter and more restrictive IPRs may serve as stimuli to growth by encouraging innovations and inventions. It then follows naturally that individuals engage in innovative activities in response to expected rewards for their efforts. Following Baumol (1993) , Bezmen & Depken (2004) suggest that this aspiration is in fact the primary motivation for any entrepreneurial activity, and it increases both total factor productivity and output level. enforce IPRs only when the innovation they consume differs from the type of innovation they supply to foreign markets (Diwan & Rodrik, 1991 
International effects
According to Bezmen & Depken (2004) (Lee & Mansfield, 1996) .
It has also been well documented that strong IPRs have a positive incidence on a nation's level of exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and they increase the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational companies (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996) . However, Yang & Maskus (2001) note that, stronger IPRs protection could also reduce the need for FDI, while Andrés (2006) , and Goel and Nelson (2009) have found copyright protection and income to be the most determining factors of IPRs in the software industry.
Bases for instrumental variables
In this section, we provide a theoretical justification for the empirical validity of the instruments. This justification is crucial for the empirical analysis required for sound and consistent interpretation of estimated coefficients. Moreover, the objective of this paper is not only to assess the impact of formal institutions on KE, but also to examine how the enforcement of IPR laws by formal institutions is instrumental in KE. The presentation is in two main strands:
the first strand provides theoretical linkages between IP treaties, government quality and KE; and the second strand justifies the instrumentality of income-levels, legal-origin, and religiousdomination. Regarding, the first strand, logic and common-sense have it that IPR laws (treaties)
are mostly enforceable only through good governance mechanisms. The most widely known IPR instruments enforced by governments are: main IP laws, IP rights laws, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, and Multilateral (Bilateral) treaties. The empirical section of this paper uses aspects of this strand as instruments.
With respect to the second strand, we provide a theoretical justification for the choice of income-levels, legal-origin, and religious-domination as relevant instrumental variables. (1) From an income-level perspective, high-income countries have tighter IPRs, better governance than their low-income counterparts, and stronger KE (Maskus, 2000) . Legal-origins differ in their emphases on private property rights vis-à-vis the powers of the state (La Porta et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2003) . Religious-domination is also crucial. The Islamic economic model, for instance, is based on and regulated by the same Shari'ya principles as the overall society (Iqbal, 1997) , whereas in non-Islamic economies there is at least a theoretical separation of religion and state.
Data and Methodology
Data
Dependent variables
Borrowing from Chavula (2010) and Weber (2011) , our dependent variables are extracted from the World Bank's knowledge index which consists of four dimensions: an economic incentive & institutional regime; educated & skilled workers; an effective innovation system; and a modern & adequate information infrastructure. Our argument for that choice is that to date, efforts to measure knowledge have been undertaken at one of two levels: first, at the individual firm level; and second, at the national systems level. Inevitably, because knowledge has informal and tacit aspects, on the one hand, as well as formal or codified forms, on the other hand, all such measurements involve proxies and indirect estimates. Firm level measurement arises out of business initiatives to manage knowledge and measure intangible assets. These efforts are operationalized at the micro level and use a combination of accounting and non-financial indicators to measure stocks of intellectual or knowledge capital, and the flows of changes in knowledge stocks (OECD, 2002) . The knowledge capacity of firms is proxied by means of instruments like balanced scorecards, intangible assets monitor, intellectual capital accounts and stylized models of knowledge spillovers (Sveiby, 1997; Lev, 2001; Boudreau, 2002) . In addition to knowledge stocks and flows, knowledge enablers are measured as a way of identifying practices with the potential to change or maintain knowledge stocks and flows. These may include either leadership, strategy, organizational partnerships, or talent (Kermally, 2002) .
At the macro level, economic models capture the generation of ideas and their association with wealth in the production function framework. Conceptually, the generic production function relates total product to labor, capital, and other inputs that combine to produce it. The deficiency of the basic production function, especially in its Cobb-Douglas functional form, in handling new innovations and endogenous technical change has since resulted in many refinements, dating back to the seminal work of Solow (1957) and Abramovitz (1956) . The subsequent 'growth accounting' literature attempts to disaggregate the residual in the standard production function by employing increasingly sophisticated econometric methods. Since knowledge is seen as embodied in technical change (Solow, 1957; Abramovitz, 1956; Amavilah, 2009) , it is the 'knowledge production function,' which postulates the generation of new knowledge as dependent on R&D capital, labor, and other inputs. Various measures of 'new knowledge', including citation weighted patents as well as new product announcements have been used in these econometric models (see Griliches, 1990 Griliches, , 1992 , for discussions on related efforts). An additional complication besides measuring knowledge either as an input or output is that knowledge can also be measure as a quantity like average years of schooling, for instance (Bils & Klenow, 2000) , a quality as in cognitive skills (see, e.g., Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008; Hanushek & Kimko, 2000) , as well as along interactions between quality and quantity.
To deal with complications like this one, there has been a variety of attempts by international bodies and countries to develop indices of science, technology or knowledge standing (see, e.g., Grupp & Mogee, 2004) . (Asongu, 2012a) .
Independent variables
Our explanatory variable of interest is governance, which is a multidimensional and broad term. We define governance as the way in which policy makers are empowered to make decisions and the manner in which policy decisions are formulated and implemented. To operationalize this concept we use a set of governance indicators that capture different aspects of governance. The World Bank indicators meet the requirement because they are constructed from several sources including polls of experts, and surveys of residents and entrepreneurs within a country and they could be grouped into three concepts (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010) .
The first concept is about the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced Each indicator, normalized to range from -2.5 to 2.5, with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one, provides a subjective assessment of some aspect of a country's quality of governance. Higher values signal better governance. Although the quality of available data suffers from the data aggregation problems, one of the advantages of aggregate indicators is that they are more informative about broad concepts of governance. Individual data provides a noisy signal of the broader concept of governance. Aggregate indicators also provide a country-wide coverage than individual indicators. Moreover, we use each indicator in isolation since they measure different aspects of the impact of governance on KE. This perspective is supported by the recent piracy literature which has shown that these variables interact differently with IPRs to produce different effects on software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a) .
Control and instrumental variables
We consider the following eight control variables: population growth, financial depth, GDP growth, financial size, inflation, government expenditure, domestic investment and financial efficiency. (Beck, et. al, 2003; Stultz & Williamson, 2003 , Agbor, 2011 Asongu, 2012b) and IPRs (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a,b) 6 .
observations for 22 SSA and MENA countries for the years 1996-2010 7 . Since some of the data are not available for all countries and/or all years, the panel data is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. Details about variable definitions, data sources, summary statistics, and correlation analysis are presented in the appendices. The 'summary statistics' (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel regressions show that there is a substantial degree of variation in the data utilized. The correlation matrix (Appendix 2) was examined with the purpose of mitigating concerns resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated. Appendix 3 provides definitions and sources of the variables.
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
An obvious limitation of this paper is that we are interested primarily in evaluating empirically the impact of formal institutions on KE, ceteris paribus. One might also criticize the redundancy in the information provided for each dimension of the KE index, since each dimension could be correlated with its component variables individually. For this reason, we use principal component analysis (PCA), a common statistical technique that is used to reduce a large set of correlated variables into a small set of uncorrelated variables, called principal components that account for most of variation in the original data set. Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . They recommend dropping factors with an eigenvalue smaller than one. Note also that the weights in the first PC are almost equal across dimensions, indicating that a one PC model is appropriate for each KE dimension in our sample.
Endogeneity
While a KE depends on formal institutions, we acknowledge that the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out, because as an economy grows in knowledge, it tends to have better governance mechanisms that enforce stringent IPR regimes. This endogeneity represents a reverse-causality.
Also, governance indicators are measures of perception, subject to significant media propaganda bias, which in turn lends credibility to the endogeneity concern. In the empirical IPR literature are subject to potential endogeneity problems, because it is likely that a nation's level of development is a crucial factor in the choice of, or adherence to, a particular IPR regime. This confirms an earlier thesis by Ginarte & Park (1997) which reveals that the level of economic development explains the strength of patent protection provided by individual countries. So, before tackling this endogeneity concern, we examine briefly its presence with the Hausman test and then employ an estimation technique compatible with the outcome of the test.
Estimation technique
Following Beck et al. (2003) and recent African development literature (Asongu, 2013) , the paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. The IV estimation technique deals effectively with the endogeneity puzzle, and therefore avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which normally arises when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term. In accordance with recent IPRs literature, the 2SLS estimation will entail the following steps:
First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression:
In Eqs. (1) and (2), GQ represents governance, measuring the institutional quality of government in regards to the rule of law, regulation quality, voice & accountability, government effectiveness, political stability/no violence and corruption-control, and γ i are the estimated effects on GQ of instruments, where instruments refer to the variables described above. KE denotes the dimensions of a KE also outlined above, and β 1i are estimated impacts of GQ on KE.
X it is a set of control variables described above and listed in the Appendix, so that β 2i are their corresponding effects on KE. Lastly, v and u represent the error terms. Again, to deploy the estimation technique, we (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining (GQ channels); and (3) 
Empirical analysis
This section has two parts. The first sub-section below presents the main empirical findings. The second sub-section interprets the results for policy and further research.
Presentation of results
This sub-section deals with results relating to two main issues: (1) the capacity of the exogenous components of the GQ channels to explain KE dimensions; and (2) the ability of the instruments to explain KE dimensions beyond the GQ channels. While the first issue is addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is contingent on the outcome of the OIR Sargan test. This method explains why we do not include the F-test because for the IV approach it is not an indispensable statistics and alternative tests like the Cragg and Donald (1993) could as well have been used. Having said that, the null hypothesis of this test is the position that the instruments explain KE only through GQ channels, i.e., IPR laws (treaties) that affect KE dimensions are enforced only through good governance mechanisms. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the stance that the IPR laws (treaties) affecting KE dimensions are not enforced beyond formal good governance institutions. A Hausman test for endogeneity precedes every 2SLS approach. The null hypothesis of this test is that OLS estimates are efficient and consistent. Thus, a rejection of this hypothesis points to the presence of inconsistent estimates owing to endogeneity and hence, lends credit to the choice of the 2SLS approach.
Tables 2-7 present results for various components of KE. The education (Table 2) , information & infrastructure (Table 3) , economic incentive (Tables 4-5) , and innovation (Tables 6-7) components of KE are regressed on GQ channels, conditional on other control variables using HAC standard errors. For all models, the Hausman test overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis, confirms the presence of endogeneity, and supports the adoption of a 2SLS modeling approach.
Except for regulation quality (which has the right sign but an insignificant estimate), the educational dimension of KE (Table 2 ), but for GQ mitigates education in KE (first issue) and the enforcement of IPR laws (treaties) by GQ channels does not stimulate education in KE (second issue). With respect to the information & infrastructure dimension of KE (Table 3) (Tables 6-7) , the upholding of tighter IP regimes through political and regulatory quality mechanisms has a negative incidence on the publication of scientific and technical journals (Table 6 ). The findings pertaining to FDI inflows (Table 7) do not enable us to establish any conclusions owing to insignificance of good governance estimates. However, in reporting such findings we are suggesting that statistical significance does not always imply economic 
Discussion of results and policy and further implications
Before discussing the results, we highlight once again the need for an understanding of the factors and forces that would determine the KE in SSA and MENA countries. The importance of link between KE and governance has been recognized.. The main idea behind this recognition is that the process of creation and diffusion of knowledge depends on appropriate governance policies that are the outcome of good governance. Therefore, it is essential to identify the institutional factors that promote the creation and diffusion of knowledge in SSA and MENA countries which have been subject to less scholarly attention. The identification permits assessing how the enforcement of IP laws by formal institutions has affected the KEs in these countries.
The findings demonstrate that the enforcement of IPR reaties through good governance mechanisms is not a sufficient condition for greater KE in SSA and MENA countries. If any positive effect exists between formal institutions and KE in these nations, then other instruments besides the upholding of IPR treaties (laws) elucidate it. However, our findings may alternatively reflect the Chinese model of KE. For instance, though there has been a clear positive relationship between good governance and the creation of KE in much of East Asia, China has largely remained an exception to this rule. China's KE development appears to come from the country's FDI function. The country's success story in attracting FDI is attributed to its spectacular growth track record, relatively better executive power, good infrastructure, abundant educated labor force, and a large domestic market (Chandra & Yokoyama, 2011, p. 46) . It seems likely that SSA and MENA countries are in the same paradigm as China with respect to the impact of good governance measures on KE.
From another standpoint, it has been well documented in the literature that the 'East Asian miracle' is largely indebted to less stringent IPRs at the early stages of the economic development of the region. This supports the thesis that the changing strength of IPR regimes depends on a nation's level of development and/or current technological ability. Evidence further suggests that the "East Asian miracle" could have been caused by weaker IPR regimes at the early stages of these nations' development in addition to their accumulation of capital. These nations' capacity to absorb, replicate and duplicate foreign innovations may have contributed to their relatively high growth rates and KE tendencies. It has been further noted that as these countries became significant producers of new technologies and innovations, their IPR regimes tightened (Nelson & Pack, 1999) . Therefore, our findings are in line with Nelson & Pack's (1999) postulation that the assimilation of existing (foreign) productive techniques and technologies was a critical component of the success with KE of these countries as opposed to SSA and MENA nations.
This view is perpendicular (contrary) to Maskus's (2000) caution that weaker protection of IPRs will not necessarily be beneficial for developing countries as it may cause them to remain dependent on older and less efficient technologies.
The findings are also consistent with the Chinese model insofar as they conform to some studies on wealth-effects that have established the existence of a non-linear relationship between income-levels and IPRs (Kim, 2004; Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) . These studies substantiate that patent protection tends to improve as economies move from low to middle-income stages, but that eventually patent protection decreases with the ability to imitate new technologies. The substance of the matter in this line of thought is that IPRs are thought to be successful at spurring economic growth and activity only after a nation has acquired sufficient human capital and technology infrastructure for creative imitation to take place. Accordingly, strong IPR protection in the early stages of industrialization, when knowledge and technology can only be acquired through reverse engineering, duplication and/or imitation, may thus hamper technology transfers in SSA and MENA countries.
Examining the findings further in the light of very recent African IPR literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013b) , reveals that results from the education dimension of KE are compatible with the thesis that adoption of tight IPR regimes may negatively affect human development by diminishing the literacy rate and restricting diffusion of knowledge. Andrés & Asongu (2013b) however document that adherence to international IPRs protection treaties (laws) may not impede per capita economic prosperity and could improve life-expectancy. Two major policy and, three further research implications emerge from our findings. One, the enforcement of very tight IPR regimes through good governance mechanisms is not a sufficient condition for the KE in SSA and MENA countries. At their current level of development enforcement of strict IPR regimes in these countries could seriously undermine efforts towards KE by restricting the dissemination of knowledge, ICTs, and innovation. Two, there are other crucial determinants of KE besides the upholding of IPRs through good governance mechanisms; the Chinese model of the KE is an alternative example, and a better reflection of what is happening in MENA and SSA countries.
One implication for further research is to subject the same data assembled in this paper to alternative estimation techniques. Another is to deploy alternative statistical techniques and estimation methods than PCA, acquire more and better data, and enlarge the sample of the countries to be investigated. Lucas and Moll (2013) proposed an intriguing model by which an economy uses its old knowledge to produce goods while at the same time "interacting with others in search for new, productivity-increasing ideas". In this sense economies do not necessarily have to abandon product-based activities for KEs. The last implication is to examine more directly the Chinese KE model to find out if it is the appropriate model of the SSA-MENA region.
Conclusion
Despite the growing importance of the KE, the debate has centered on Latin America and East Asian countries, leaving the situation surrounding MENA and SSA countries unexplained.
This paper is a modest attempt to fill the gap in our understanding of factors responsible for 
